. . . and still no disclosure from Aldevo. Just what is your agenda posting on APUG? I have trouble finding anything you have posted beyond doom and gloom connected to film production. Perhaps you are a day trader hoping to generate some activity.
Now to stop the lunacy a bit, some history, which I should add is in the past Annual Reports and SEC reports that can be downloaded by anyone. Kodak decided to get more into the commercial printing business prior to Perez becoming CEO. One of the first companies purchased was in San Diego a company known as Encad, who produced plotters and wide format inkjet. You will never find such a printer in CompUSA, nor Best Buy, nor Office Depot. This move was to place them more into commercial graphic arts supplies, though that business community did not highly regard Encad printers. Next step was to get a portion of printing technology from Heidelberg, who had a desire to leave part of the market segment. After that was the recent purchase of Creo . . . and suddenly Kodak went from a small player barely in commercial printing and graphic arts supplies, into about the largest player in the industry. All these company purchases cost a ton of money, which relates directly to many of the charges filed in those EK SEC reports. The idea of all this was that the consumer market would not provide the bulk of revenues and profits, and also that emerging markets around the world have been experiencing a greater demand for printed materials.
Okay, so none of that directly relates to consumer films, consumer inkjet printers, nor consumer compact digital cameras. Kodak's early investment in digital imaging was bleeding money, though their were two hopes tied to the investment. The first was that people shooting a higher volume of images would be printing a higher volume of images. This was the prediction from numerous PMAI reports, and from big predictors like Gartner Group. What actually happened was that few of these new technology camera owners actually printed anything, so the idea of profits from printing to offset losses from the cameras did not happen. Then came the kiosk idea, including an EK purchase of some interesting technology, and again the amount of usage of these kiosks did not offset losses. Almost coinciding with that was the idea of home printing of images, and as maybe should have been expected, sales were low and few people took up this route, so no high profit inks and papers to offset digital imaging losses. The other idea was that once a company got enough market share, they could then raise prices to generate a profit; so far this has not worked for any players in this market other than Nikon (and yes, Canon offset losses through their business and office printing division), though I should point out that is from 2005 figures, so maybe a slight change (though again, that is more than six years losses for any company in this market segment).
Onwards to Kodak Polychrome Graphics (KPG), now mostly under the GCG. At one point, KPG was remarketing a printer using mostly HP parts (DesignJet series, not consumer printers). While the quality was better than their Encad offerings, I would imagine Kodak wanted their own solution (Perez was CEO at this point). The offerings were towards the business and professional markets.
Then came a reorganization of divisions within Kodak, and how those divisions were reported in the SEC reports. When losses from one division might be cause for concern, then lump them into another division that is still generating a profit. Thus digital imaging got lumped with consumer films into consumer imaging, and a slight profit was shown. Finding out the internal numbers, detailed breakdowns, product specific earning, et al. are not required in SEC reports; so comments on those aspects could only be speculation.
Another item not often mentioned is Kodak investing heavily into Lucky Film in China. As part of that agreement a few years ago, Kodak signed a 20 year funding promiss to Lucky Film. Kodak have at least 16 years left on that agreement. The downside on the agreement was that Kodak wanted a larger share of ownership of Lucky Film, though the Chinese government limited that part of the agreement. However, Kodak has a foot in the Chinese market, and can see some profits from this (mostly film based) investment.
So in conclusion, consumer film profits prop up consumer digital losses at Kodak. Without another redistribution and change in structure on SEC reports, to get rid of consumer films would mean EK would need to show losses in consumer imaging. A more likely occurance is Kodak subcontracting compact digital camera construction, or selling off that division, while retaining the profitable chip making group. Another possibility is moving more production to China, though unless the Chinese government changes their foreign ownership stance, it might be quite a while until that happens, if ever. In other words, several things need to happen at Kodak prior to anything happening with consumer films.
Note: I have a stack of SEC reports on EK just over 2' high sitting in my office. There is no way practical for me to type out that much, to give even more detail. I encourage anyone to read the SEC reports of the last eight years. Those even more interested in this should read the last six years PMAI reports, and consider paying for a couple Gartner Group reports on the consumer imaging and photofinishing markets.
Ciao!
Gordon Moat
Dead Link Removed