Kodak crashed and burned because they made a knowing decision early on NOT to defend their world-class, world-leading technologies. That included both film and digital. It's as simple as that, really.
When it came to film technology, like it or not, Kodak was in total control. They were the 800-pound gorilla that dominated the field. They had the most money, the best researchers, the best products, the biggest market, and the adoration of generations of loyal customers. Everyone else was just simply trying to keep up.
To those who claim Kodak could not keep up with digital imaging technology, they miss the fact that Kodak invented it. And because they invented it there was a point in time at the beginning where by definition they controlled it completely and were ahead of everyone else, bar none.
But somewhere along the line the decision makers at Kodak were served up and swallowed the infamous "easy digital billions" Kool-Aid. They came to believe that only by instantly and completely abandoning their century-plus of world-class emulsion and coating expertise and products could they lay their hands on those elusive digital billions. And in trying to do so they threw it all away.
In the person of their new CEO they ended up working harder to stop film than they did to start anything else. In building their bridge across the river to the promised land, for every new digital plank they laid down in front, they pulled up two analog planks from behind. Inevitably those dual trend lines crossed leaving them stuck mid-river without a viable path in either direction.
What could they have done differently?
Defended their top-of-the-line film imaging technology (see Sal's post above), marketing it as the higher quality option for discriminating photographers, while they concurrently worked to improve and control their newer digital imaging technology (again, see Sal above) and carefully blended it into their analog product lines as more appropriate for the birthday candles crowd.
Successful companies make their own markets. Kodak was more than big enough, rich enough, and bad-ass enough to have controlled the direction that the new technology would take. They were already doing that with film. There was nothing stopping them from doing it with digital. Except thoughtful foresight.
My dream for Kodak (listen up, all you who think I'm anti-Kodak...) was to be the biggest and baddest imaging company on the planet—which would only have been an extension of what they already were with film. To have a beautifully maintained and comprehensive portfolio of correctly marketed, highly supported, continually improved, and perfectly price-point positioned film and digital imaging product lines for both professionals and consumers.
But instead they drank the Kool-Aid and ended up all trying to crowd onto that last remaining plank in the middle of a raging river, seemingly clueless about how they got there, and constantly pointing fingers at everyone and everything else for their predicament, while the managers with the biggest bonuses spent their time throwing all of the lesser stakeholders into the icy waters below.
I am still so mad at those guys I could spit...
Ken