I strongly disagree with that statement. There was nothing 'rapid' about what happened; it took over 20 years. In the early days of digital imaging, Kodak tried a number of products designed to promote film use like the Premiere Image Enhancement System and several film scanners.
Fair enough. I might be persuaded to strike the
"rapid" modifier. The remainder, however, stands.
But then again, perhaps not. One could also make the argument that 20 years ago the tactical focus was to integrate that new-fangled digital thing into the existing film infrastructure. Not to replace it entirely.
My sense is that once a strategic decision was made to replace film with digital—the point more or less when the previous CEO was so promoted and tasked—the death spiral was relatively rapid, lasting only six-plus years from May, 2005 to January, 2012 when bankruptcy was filed.
Early on even the idea of moving to an all-digital consumer photo model which could, at least in principle, have leveraged a still existing film customer base was itself abandoned in the rush, and a move to commercial printing as the primary business model took in its place. They needed money, and fast.
I well remember reading in the news of the mass departures from the board of directors right before the bankruptcy filing as the failed rodents sought to quietly desert the sinking ship.
So I don't see Kodak as being interested at all in direct-marketing their remaining films going forward. They have already required a massive bailout from the MP industry just to keep those product lines temporarily afloat.* Their long-term interest in selling more Portra to consumers has got to be close to zero degrees Kelvin.
Ken
* Ostensibly for the MP industry's benefit, not for Kodak's.