And as a result, we still have excellent Kodak Portra, Tri-X. the TMAXes and now even E100 again. Agfa on the other side ...
Sometimes we as analog community benefit, if companies have less "superior insight", carefully step into any trap they can find in the market, and still somehow stay afloat through a barrage of true miracles.
No, it's not. In fact it just about typifies the membership here....This is...above you...
No such people exist today. This is PHOTRIO.... APUG members.
I worked for 40 years as a professional buyer, and often interacted with both CEO's and other high executives of major manufacturing corporations. Lots of things became awfully predictable beginning in the 80's, then accelerating in the 90's, when the "armchair quarterbacks" most certainly were not people like me, expected to make an honest living through hard work, but many of those big shots themselves imported from previous roles where they didn't have any real experience either, rapidly wrecking one longstanding corporation after another, yet themselves getting richer every time through golden parachute contracts, induced stock market upward burbs linked to smoke and mirrors "market-share" myths, and similar nonsense really bad for the long-term health of the corporation itself. Anyone from GE was the worst. Every time one of those guys got planted as head of a manufacturing company, I knew the end was near, and started looking for a new supplier. Just like politicians and big developers, these were high-energy types excellent at back-slapping schmoozing and throwing big parties, but otherwise incompetent. It didn't take all that much to know that anyone even slightly in the know from real hands-on experience knew a LOT more than that kind of CEO. Sometimes it was simply ludicrous.
But whenever I encountered a manufacturer headed by an engineer who had worked his way from the bottom up, I knew I had found a winner. Most of those were involved with Euro privately-held corporations, and extremely knowledgeable, while most US mfgs gaming the stock market were already jumping ship as fast as they could going international to avoid taxes and labor laws, and outsourcing to China to obtain bait-and-switch inventories as cheaply as possible, yet sold at high markup. A totally predictable trainwreck. No I'm no expert in the camera and film side of it; but distinct parts of that story are no doubt analogous. And at least in the aspect I was entrusted with juggling, I did it well enough to make my employers a helluva lot of money, and myself a decent retirement.
Yep, there's a lot of quick profit in selling off your own blood and organ and limbs; but you don't live long.
Their digital cameras sold really well from the nineties to the early two thousands.
They didn’t make much profit though.
Well, it's heading in that direction.I’m pretty sure Canon, Nikon, and Sony would disagree. It might not have been the absurd profit levels that Kodak was used to, but the digital camera market is not exactly a tiny, low profit market.
They didn't steal anything, Kodaks ideas was much better and markedly different.This is easily explained. The people at the top were idiots, and it looks like not much else has changed over the years. Stealing Polaroid's technology and having to pay out nearly a billion dollars on the lawsuit which followed was incredibly dumb. Who or what in their company had the stupidity to OK this enterprise?
I'm a betting man, and would bet that Kodak the company will not be around much longer. It will break into little companies. Good riddance. This is a perfect example of cause and effect. All I want from them is an occasional roll of Tri-X, and I now buy slightly expired rolls of it from individuals to make sure that Kodak doesn't get a dime on the deal.
http://insideanalogphotoradio.solidsight.net/articles/ep-130.html@Helge there is a radio interview with Ron Mowrey, in which he explained Kodak's reasoning. The were a company run by chemical engineers, not computer scientists, and as a result they did not grok the implications of Moore's law. They expected digital photography to be acceptable to amateur customers by 2010. Kodak invested big in a massive coating facility in the late 90ies and was totally caught off guard, when digital cameras became popular in the early 2000s.
Their whole behavior since 2000 followed Sun Tzu's teachings "when on desperate ground: fight". They did try to maneuver into all kinds of digital domains, albeit with very little success.
A new technology had come along, and the American companies that perpetuated it chose to offshore their production to a country that did not collect confiscatory taxes from the America companies, unlike their home jurisdictions, and with an available labor force any times that in the US. A country bent on world domination through manipulation of currency. The new technology spread like wildfire, due to price. and volume. Kodak was consumed and left in ashes, as were may industries.
Kodak was well aware of digital sensor technology, but they were not familiar with exponential increases in performance over time. Just as with the corona virus response world wide, people without years of experience are ill equipped to understand the true impact of exponential growth, until it hits them straight in the face.As I indicated in my reference to Agfa, that new technology neither came out of the blue, the photochemical industry had to cope with it for decades before (but not on a market which is typically looked at here at Apug), nor was that technology alien to the industry, it still is imaging.
Moore’s law has little if anything to do with sensors.Given Kodak's heritage as specialty chemical manufacturer and thin film coater (making film is essentially these two) one could consider the digital sensor one such "skunk works" type project. They built up tremendous capability in this area, they did supply the sensors for both Canon's and Nikon's pro level dSLRs back then.
If Kodak still did not see digital sensors as viable consumer product before 2010, then the wrong people made market forecasts. Ron's claim, that chemical engineers did not fully appreciate Mr. Moore's law, sounds quite credible in this context.
A new technology had come along, and the American companies that perpetuated it chose to offshore their production to a country that did not collect confiscatory taxes from the America companies, unlike their home jurisdictions,
I assume you are praising a former US president. Kodak did their reorganization before he decided to change careers from a reality TV guy. Thankfully that era has ended.For 3 years prosperity was once again flourishing in his country that he loved. Then a disease appeared from that other country, the economy stumbled, and the domestic malcontents of that leader's own country finally succeeded in their previous 3 years of non-stop coup attempts.
What did Agfa Leverkusen do wrong? Their task mainly was to go on with Agfa's classic consumer business, when top management seemingly already saw no future for such and thus they were sold off (or closed, depending on viewpoint) from one day to the other.
squandered it buying back stock rather than on modernization. .
Well, the feeling is that the sale and following bancrupsy was made up. The case even became topic at teaching at a business school to show a way to cheaply get rid of an unwanted business (so much about ethics in business education...) and the state prosecutor looked at it.the folks at the actual factory did not do anything wrong, But the business did blow up due to some short sighted action by the folks who bought it from AGFA.
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