The premise is fundamentally untrue.
Exactly!What is the premise that is fundamentally untrue?
Thanks
pentaxuser
My understanding is Kodak did not understand how quickly film and paper sales would decline, a decline of 80% in paper and film alone in just a few years. Second Kodak had massive plants, had a hard time scaling down. Third unlike Fujifilm they bet on the wrong products for divarication, inkjets, really?
PLus they were hoping (against the odds as it turned out) that they could come up with something that had the same "Hook" as their consumer film cameras. which used film AND processing materials on a regular basis in almost every home.There was just not anyone at Kodak willing to risk going all in.
Kodak held many very important patents on electronic image sensors and processing. Far more than the usually mentioned Bayer array.The biggest reason that Kodak foundered is that they were structured in a way that depended on selling high margin products. That was what funded the large, well paid employee workforce and extensive dealer network support infrastructure.
The digital photographic market has never offered those sorts of margins, other than perhaps the printer ink market.
Their institutional shareholders were not willing to accept years of low return restructuring, so attempts to replace the revenue streams with other, potentially high margin alternatives were the choices that management made.
All of the possibilities available would have resulted in tremendous amounts of disruption and job loss.
They had amble warning with first instant photography, which showed how much simple and immediate (quality takes a backseat at best) speaks to some very basic emotions in humans (Polaroid was allegedly founded on Lands little daughter asking “why can’t I see it know‽” after seeing a photo getting taken).
And later on how very quickly Super 8 got killed off by video tape. There is nothing people like more than perceived free.
They knew very well what was happening.
There was just not anyone at Kodak willing to risk going all in.
Not quite. That applied only to the USA. Well, the patent infringement case would have practically effect worldwide, but that buy-back was a US thing.That's true, Kodak lost a patent infringement suit brought by Polaroid, had to buy all the Kodak Instant Cameras back and pay a large settlement to Polaroid.
@Helge there is a radio interview with Ron Mowrey, in which he explained Kodak's reasoning. The were a company run by chemical engineers, not computer scientists, and as a result they did not grok the implications of Moore's law. They expected digital photography to be acceptable to amateur customers by 2010. Kodak invested big in a massive coating facility in the late 90ies and was totally caught off guard, when digital cameras became popular in the early 2000s.
Their whole behavior since 2000 followed Sun Tzu's teachings "when on desperate ground: fight". They did try to maneuver into all kinds of digital domains, albeit with very little success.
This is easily explained. The people at the top were idiots, and it looks like not much else has changed over the years. Stealing Polaroid's technology and having to pay out nearly a billion dollars on the lawsuit which followed was incredibly dumb. Who or what in their company had the stupidity to OK this enterprise?
When in college in the 60s our darkroom instructor, darkroom time was considered a lab and we had a separate instructor from the prof who a taught the classroom portion, hated Kodak, not the products the company. He had a long list of companies he claimed Kodak drove out of business, he felt Kodak stole patented process which included 3M and ANSCO/GAF. I think Kodak thought they could wear Polaroid down then make a settlement offer and keep on trucking with their version of instant film and cameras.
@Helge there is a radio interview with Ron Mowrey, in which he explained Kodak's reasoning. The were a company run by chemical engineers, not computer scientists, and as a result they did not grok the implications of Moore's law. They expected digital photography to be acceptable to amateur customers by 2010. Kodak invested big in a massive coating facility in the late 90ies and was totally caught off guard, when digital cameras became popular in the early 2000s.
Their whole behavior since 2000 followed Sun Tzu's teachings "when on desperate ground: fight". They did try to maneuver into all kinds of digital domains, albeit with very little success.
But to put the Kodak case in perspective, Agfa already as soon as the year 2000, in hindsight the world-peak in consumer film production, considered getting rid of their consumer branch, and in 2004 did so.Few industry experts, perhaps being chemists, had an inkling of just how fast amateur and digital imaging would improve.
The digital market was already known to lack the ongoing sales associated with film supplies....users of film bought more film, used developing and usually printing services....there was a business model there. For digital photography unless you reckoned they'd buy a camera every year, there was no ongoing business model....except for printer ink.
.
And as a result, we still have excellent Kodak Portra, Tri-X. the TMAXes and now even E100 again. Agfa on the other side ...But to put the Kodak case in perspective, Agfa already as soon as the year 2000, in hindsight the world-peak in consumer film production, considered getting rid of their consumer branch, and in 2004 did so.
Their business model was to keep al non-consumer clients and supply them with film as long as needed, the same time going digital with them. Not all these approaches went smooth, their modular industry-printer line no longer exists. And furthermore they had to keep their remaining chemical plants running...
We use cookies and similar technologies for the following purposes:
Do you accept cookies and these technologies?
We use cookies and similar technologies for the following purposes:
Do you accept cookies and these technologies?